Wednesday
16Dec2009

The View From the Veranda

By Michael A. Innes.

Last week I gave a talk to some students at the School of Politics and International Studies (POLIS), at the University of Leeds. I've been an honorary Visiting Research Fellow with POLIS since April 2006, and it's a rare occasion when I'm actually on-site. In fact, this was only the second time, the first being a talk I gave in late 2007. Then, I was still a serving staff officer with NATO, and my talk was about a book I'd just published. This time, I was speaking as an academic, recently resigned from NATO service, and offering students my observations on what it's like to be a functionary in an International Organization. Despite working in some very interesting places - Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghansitan, as well as Western Europe - I couldn't honestly claim to know much about them, and my own perceptions of those experiences are very much "the view from the veranda."

That phrase is lifted from an article, written by Belgian academic Julian Eckl and published in International Political Sociology, entitled "Responsible Scholarship After Leaving the Veranda: Normative Issues Faced by Field Researchers - and Armchair Scientists." Reading it was part of a broader effort to understand how the infrastructure of military interventions conflicts with the drive for ethnographic detail and context about states that host them. More importantly, I think it goes straight to the heart of knowledge claims. Debates on how we come to know the things we think we know - epistemological assumptions about the nature of research and understanding - are nothing new. In Iraq and Afghanistan, the problems are acute: headquarters life has been widely portrayed as  a disconnected bubble - an alien, hermetic imposition that squats amid the local environment while employing anthropologists and other social scientists to fill in the blanks on local culture.

Baghdad's Green Zone, the barricaded home of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), has been a particular focus of such reporting. There, "imperial life in the emerald city" raises uncomfortable questions about just how much visiting advisors can learn and achieve - even those afforded a full year or more on the ground, and no matter how exotically qualified they might be. A number of journalists have been quick to point out the problem. New York Times reporter Dexter Filkins lived in Baghdad for almost four years, from the 2003 Invasion to the height of the insurgency in late 2006. In his memoir, The Forever War, he wrote "It was in the Green Zone that I would think the war was lost. I didn't think about losing when I was outside - when I was in Iraq." In The Assassin's Gate, George Packer, the New Yorker staff writer, described the almost surreal disconnect that came with moving from one world to the next: "I went back and forth between the Green and Red Zones, between the CPA and Iraq, feeling almost dizzy at the transition, two separate realities existing on opposite sides of concrete and wire."

What Packer and Filkins described in their respective books is almost identical to my own sense that the distance between observer and observed is infinitely elastic. In September 2001, the same month that Al Qaeda's terrorists visited havoc on Manhattan, human rights activist and Pulitzer Prize winning journalist Samantha Power published an article in The Atlantic on the Rwanda Genocide of 1994. It's opening section was titled "People Sitting In Offices," an allusion to the bureaucratic penchant of far-away politicians in Washington and New York to second-guess the reports and judgments of field-based observers. The irony is thick: after living and working at both ends of the food chain, I often found myself sitting behind the protective barrier of a desktop monitor, in Sarajevo, Pristina, Kabul, reading reports from the field and second-guessing the facts they purported to convey. I wasn't far away; I was right around the corner. People sitting in offices, as it turns out, don't need to be squirreled away in bunkers on the Potomac to do their damage.

And so it's with no small amount of skepticism about what can be "known", one way or the other, that I read work like Eckl's. His premise is, I think, straightforward and uncontroversial. "Ethnographic  methods like participant observation differ significantly from other methods," the article's abstract states, "since they explicitly blur the boundary between theory and practice; this blurring requires researchers to carefully evaluate their conflicting responsibilities to the people studied, to the scientific community, and to themselves." Sure.  "Many of the insights generated in ethnology are relevant for political scientists, too, especially for those political scientists who are prepared to ‘‘leave the veranda’’ and want to put ethnographic methods to use, but also for those who prefer to remain in the position of an ‘‘armchair’’ researcher." Still fine. 

It's Eck's more practical recommendations that feel, well... awkward. Scholarly "objectivity" and "neutrality" are laudable goals for researchers, and achieving even some semblance of them is the height of methodological rigor. But when politics enters the picture, things get more complicated. At issue then is whether scholars should proactively seek to limit access to their research findings rather than allow some potential future misuse of their work. Eckl thinks so. He also makes an interesting case for the idea that "the field" has, traditionally, represented very different things to anthropologists and to political scientists, and that the pressures of co-option either way must be resisted. He recommends reliance on documentary evidence as one way of avoiding the perils of "going native"; as a trained historian, I see that as a red herring of sorts. What Eckl doesn't do, unfortunately, is reconcile the worlds of the anthropologist and the political scientist, of the field observer and the deskbound researcher. There is real and social distance that separates people sitting in offices from their grubby counterparts living and breathing outside the wire. We need to understand both, and to value both.

Eckl, J. (2008). "Responsible Scholarship After Leaving the Veranda: Normative Issues Faced by Field Researchers-and Armchair Scientists." International Political Sociology, 2 (3), 185-203 DOI: 10.1111/j.1749-5687.2008.00044.x

Sunday
06Dec2009

Smogtown: The Lung Burning History of Pollution in Los Angeles

By John Matthew Barlow.

Smogtown: The Lung-Burning History of Pollution in Los Angeles
By Chip Jacobs and William J. Kelly
US: Overlook Press, 2008. 384pp., $26.95
UK: Overlook Press, 2008. 384pp., £16.96

Hudson Elementary School in Long Beach, California, lies along the busy Terminal Island Freeway, which carries trucks from the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach.  Across the highway there’s a rail yard where diesel locomotives, like the trucks barrelling past, carry cargo containers from the twin-port complex.  Emissions from the trucks and trains, not to mention from nearby ships, oil refineries, and other industrial facilities clustered around the port, have made the location of the elementary school one of the most polluted points in sprawling Los Angeles.  On a daily basis, diesel soot creeps into the lungs of young students, increasing their rate of asthma and respiratory infections and laying the groundwork for long-term health risks like cancer and heart disease before they get even to high school. [p. 313].

This vignette opens chapter 12 of Chip Jacobs and William J. Kelly’s exploration of the history of smog in Los Angeles, and the long and arduous battle against it since the Second World War.  Los Angeles and smog are pretty much synonymous in our culture. 

The story of Hudson Elementary School comes towards the end of Smogtown, as the authors shift their focus from the global battle against smog and air pollution in the City of Angels to the plight of minority and poor communities in the industrialised sprawl of the city.  Not surprisingly, despite all the advances made in L.A. in the fight against smog and air pollution, low-lying industrial neighbourhoods are still buried under toxic clouds.  And it is also not surprising to find that the residential areas around these industrial neighbourhoods are ones populated by the working classes and immigrants (oftentimes one and the same). 

Historically, the fight against smog and air pollution in Los Angeles, at least as demonstrated by Jacobs and Kelly, is one that united Angelenos, as they were all affected by it, to varying degrees.  The Rodney King riots form a virtual watershed moment in Los Angeles history, and not just in terms of culture and racial relations in the US’ second largest city.  The fight against smog was also caught up in the fallout from the riots in 1992.  In discussing the backlash against L.A.’s smog tsar, Jim Lents, whose heavy-handed solutions rubbed some the wrong way, Jacobs and Kelly argue that:

[t]he backlash against carpooling [which Lents advocated] became part of a larger resistance to Lents and his air pollution program.  Opposition businesses, labor, and politicians grew after a recession gripped the nation following he first Gulf War under President George H.W. Bush.  Unemployment began to climb amid a downturn in defense spending after the war and a seeming onslaught of foreign imports and outsourcing by U.S. companies.  Amid the weakening economy and a growing divide between the haves and have-nots, in 1992, an all-white suburban jury acquitted four white police officers in the case of the Rodney King beating.  In an eruption of rage, thousands of L.A.’s poorest residents participated in what was variously called a riot, a rebellion, or a civil disturbance…

As political leaders tried to understand what was happening to the economy and what was fueling the racial tensions revealed by the Rodney King incident, many pointed their finger at the [South Coast Air Quality Management District’s – which had jurisdiction over smog in the L.A. region] tough rules on business.  They claimed that companies had been leaving the area to escape the cost of complying with the smog rules, stranding workers in the process and creating animosities along class and racial lines. [p. 281].

In other words, smog and air pollution are so embedded in Angeleno culture, it’s impossible to escape them.

Smogtown is an eye-opener, in part for the story of Los Angeles, and in part because this is a universal story, that of smog.  Other cities have dealt with smog as bad, if not worse, than Los Angeles: London had a horrible outbreak in the 1880s.  Seventy years later, in 1952, London had a four-day smog attack that left 4,000 more people dead than under normal circumstances (which is a euphemism for saying the smog did it, but there was no hard evidence to link smog to the deaths in 1952 because this isn’t what the scientists looked for).  Circumstances repeated themselves in London in 1956 and 1962.  New York City lost nearly 700 people in smog attacks in 1953, 1963, and 1966.  Chicago, Pittsburgh, Hamilton, Ontario, all these places had toxic air either periodically or perpetually.  But what made Los Angeles the grand-daddy of all smog cities was an unfortunate confluence of natural weather patterns plus industrialisation and the attendant pollution.

Los Angeles was a late-blooming city in North American terms.  Metropolitan L.A. grew from 250,000 people at the turn of the 20th century to 3.25 million by 1940.  The story of Hollywood’s rise, which took place during the first half of the 20th century, is a familiar one.  But less familiar is the story of industrialisation in L.A., as the region became home to massive coal-fired power plants, oil refineries, as well as the Los Angeles-Long Beach port system, one of the largest in the world.  Unregulated industrial expansion, plus the natural weather system of the region means smog.  Indeed, the Chumash aboriginals, the original inhabitants of the L.A. region called it “the valley of smoke” because their fires caused smog.  The L.A. region and the San Fernando Valley are susceptible to atmospheric inversion, which means that all of the pollutants in the air from cars, trucks, planes, trains, manufacturing, the ports, etc., are held in the air above the city.  Moreover, because Los Angeles gets so little rain, the smog builds up day after day.  Finally, prevailing wind patterns from the Pacific blow air in, but then it gets caught up against the mountains, creating a toxic soup over the city.  In hindsight, it seems that maybe Los Angeles wasn’t the best place to build a sprawling, massive metropolis that today is home to some 17 million people.

L.A.’s battle with the smog monster began on 8 July 1943, when the city was inundated with a gray mist that descended over the city, leading to chaos on the streets, as people ran for shelter and cover.  After all, America was at war.  It was not even 2 years since the Japanese attack of Pearl Harbor, and only 16 months since the Japanese Imperial Navy had tried to shell an oil refinery in Santa Barbara, less than 100 miles up the coast from L.A..  Was this another Japanese attack, this time on the metropolis of L.A. itself?  It soon became apparent that this was not the work of the Japanese, but of nature.  L.A. was being attacked by smog.

Tough-talking bureaucrats attempted to tackle the smog monster almost immediately, but to little avail.  This was largely because industry in the L.A. region refused to take the threat of smog seriously, arguing variously that 1) smog wasn’t dangerous; 2) it wasn’t their fault; 3) if they moved, shut down, or even put in place pollution reducing technology it would hurt L.A.’s economy in general.  Even after as a whole academic infrastructure grew to join the bureaucrats, the battle raged.  In 1949, Arie “Haggy” Haagen-Smit, a bio-chemist at The California Institute of Technology (CalTech), stepped outside for a breath of fresh air and a break from his work of trying to extract the fragrance from pineapple:

yet when the hawk-nosed scientist inhaled that day, what he drew in did not seem pure, and it definitely wasn’t invigorating.  It was harsh and bleach-tinged, a bronchial sucker punch.  Haggy, forty-nine, coughed hard.  As history would have it, it was the hack heard around the world. [p. 70]

Haagen-Smit went to work in his CalTech lab; he took a sample of the air outside his lab, distilled some frozen vapour, extracted a few drops of liquid from that, extracted their acids, and then converted them into derivatives.  And from there, he figured out that something was causing oxidisation in the Los Angeles air.  He had found the smoking gun to prove that L.A.’s smog was caused by both the oil refineries that ringed Long Beach and the automobile.  In those days, cars and trucks didn’t have all the smog-reducing equipment they do today, like catalytic converters (which were put in American cars in the early 1970s as a means of assuaging L.A.’s smog cops) and car engines were not as efficient in burning gas as they are today (another innovation caused by L.A.’s fight against pollution).

For the next several decades, L.A.’s smog cops, with ambivalent support from the state government in Sacramento, were engaged in pitched battles with the car and oil industries in Detroit and California in order to clean up Los Angeles’ skies.  Jacobs and Kelly detail this fight in detail, taking time to discuss the citizen-activists who also took up the cause, from the wives of movie producers to a used car salesman, Ed Koupal.  Jacobs and Kelly deftly weave a narrative of the battles of these community activists both with and against the smog cops and other bureaucrats in charge of the South Coast Air Quality Management District (AQMD), and its various predecessor organisations. 

Well-regarded journalists, both, Jacobs and Kelly tell a lively, and evocative story.  Who knew reading about the history of smog in Los Angeles could be so entertaining?

However, Jacobs and Kelly miss the major tension in Angelino and American culture regarding the fight over smog in their book.  One of the greatest opponents of the L.A. smog cops and their attempts to clean up the air in the city was none other than Ronald Reagan, who was governor of California from 1967-75.  Reagan was a conservative, a small-government Republican (ironic, of course); he fought to keep government out of the smog battle, thinking industry was best left to regulate itself.  For him, the battle was one between public good versus private rights.  And for a man like Reagan, private rights would almost always prevail.  Reagan, however, was emblematic of a very deep strain of American, and Californian, culture.  Despite California’s reputation as a wacky place, with a long, colourful history, it is also a state that has a very deep conservative streak to it, as evidenced by Reagan’s successful two-term run as governor.  This battle between public good and private rights, especially when the were the private rights of large corporations, lies at the heart of the battle over the air of Los Angeles.  And whilst Jacobs and Kelly come back to this theme repeatedly in the book, they never seem to make the explicit connection between small-government, private rights supporters and an unwillingness to work for the public good in taming smog in California’s largest city, especially during Reagan’s gubernatorial reign and presidential term in the 1980s. 

Even before the rise of Reagan in the late 1960s (a man who seems to be at odds with pop culture in California during that period, I might add, given the student sit-ins at Berkeley and the anti-Vietnam demonstrators, to say nothing of the rise of Haight-Ashbury in San Francisco in the same year Reagan became governor, 1967), this tension was apparent in the fight over L.A.’s skies.  Whilst a municipal bureaucracy, and then a county-based, and then a regionally-based one, sought to regulate and enforce smog reduction policies, corporations, and their supporters in business, sought to enforce their freedom.  Thus a fundamental tension of American culture was laid bare in California: individual v. societal freedoms.  What is good for everyone isn’t necessarily good for the individual, argue the Reaganites.  And government intervention is cast, in many ways, as anti-American.  This libertarianism existed in the 40s when smog first reared its ugly head in California, reflected through a frontier mentality, and it exists well into the 21st century.

Given this tension, it is rather impressive that L.A.’s smog busters were so successful.  As Jacobs and Kelly point out, smog alerts were almost ubiquitous in the 60s and 70s in Los Angeles; more than half of the year, the air in L.A. was dangerous.  Today, stage 1 smog alerts (the worst kind) are rare in L.A..  At the same time, California’s pollution controls and emissions requirements for cars are the most stringent in the world, and are being emulated throughout North America.  Car companies in Detroit, Japan, and Germany are being forced to build cars that are responsive to California’s demands, which can only be beneficial for the rest of us.  California’s power is based on its size, as the most populous American state.  Its 2008 population of 36.8 million people makes it larger than most Western nations, including Canada, the Netherlands, Austria, Australia, and so on.  Los Angeles County by itself is more populous than 42 US states.  Its economy, measured by GDP, is greater than all but the G8 nations, minus Canada, plus Russia and China.  In this case, size does matter.  But we are all healthier for it.

This tension between individual rights and the common good is also obvious in the behaviour of average Angelinos, something which Jacobs and Kelly are quick to point out.  But again, they miss the opportunity to make the connection.  Jim Lents was forced out as head of the AMQD in 1997,

his call for lifestyle changes and personal sacrifice was largely rejected, even by his own staff.  Today, the parking lot at AQMD headquarters in Diamond Bar is full of large sport utility vehicles that guzzle gas, emit pollution, and contribute to global warming.  Where the AQMD [once] stood in El Monte when Lents arrived there is now a fast food court full of the drive-through restaurants he once envisioned banning.  Both are a rebuke to his unfinished agenda.  They demonstrate that as much as Angelenos profess environmentalism, their commitment stops short of personal sacrifice. [p. 291].

They continue the assault:

Los Angeles could have turned toward a different lifestyle and become like a Mediterranean city after the first smog siege, with rich urban neighborhoods where people walk the promenade at night.  Instead Angelenos bought into the idea that suburban living – with two cars in every garage – marked progress, as General Electric and Ronald Reagan insisted. [p. 291].

Why this surprises Jacobs and Kelly is beyond me: this is pretty basic human behaviour.  We live in an era where politicians and business people, as well as economists and other academics baldly lie when they tell us that to cut emissions, to accord to Kyoto, would be economic suicide.  This is especially true in North America.  Meanwhile, we live in a culture that encourages us to buy bigger, to have more stuff.  We are products of a culture that has encouraged us to be (post-)modern, to acquire more goods.  Indeed, in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, then-President George W. Bush advised Americans that the best thing they could do to show their resilience against the terrorists was to go shopping! 

On the one hand, it is easy to see why the AQMD parking lot is full of SUVs and the organisation’s former headquarters is now littered with drive-thrus; on the other, however, it is just as easy to see that behaviour such as this is destroying the environment whilst we are trying to save it.  Los Angeles is far from the only location where this tension is clear.  In Canada, we have a Prime Minister who, despite all evidence to the contrary, continues to tell us that to cut our emissions drastically would be to kill our economy, and has even used the current recession as an excuse to ignore the emissions problems emanating from the Alberta oil sands. 

Moreover, Los Angeles would never have turned into a Mediterranean city for one simple reason: it is not in the cultural DNA of North Americans to replicate life on the French Riviera.  Certainly, other options could have been explored, but they all would’ve fallen short of Athens or Rome (both, I might add, are cities with fiercesome smog problems of their own). 

At any rate, Jacobs and Kelly remain cynical, despite all the work that has been done in Los Angeles, despite the countless sacrifices of various Angelenos at all levels of society, to ensure a better future.  Certainly, as they note, of the 9,600 people who die per year from smog in California, the majority are in Los Angeles.  But even that is a massive improvement over the mid-20th century.  Moreover, it simply is not the case that the masses have tuned out and refused personal sacrifice.  As Janine Schipper points out in her study of urban sprawl in the Sonora Desert around Phoenix, in the 2000 national elections in the US, there were 209 ballot initiatives supporting land preservation around the nation.  Most of them were initiatives that called for taxation, and 83 per cent of them were successful.

Rather than criticism, given the fundamental nature of the problem of people not willing to make personal sacrifices to clean up the environment, one would expect Jacobs and Kelly to offer constructive discussion as to how to engage with people, how to convince people that they must take action.  However, they make no such effort to engage with the fiction of economic suicide that emissions cuts will bring, other than to mention it briefly.

Indeed, ultimately, this is my biggest concern with Smogtown: it is all glitz and glamour and lacks substance.  Jacobs and Kelly tell a wonderful, lively story.  They point out the ins and outs of the fight for clean air in Los Angeles.  But there is no deeper analysis in their critique of opponents of the smog fighters.  It’s less a case that I am calling for an objective history here; what I would’ve liked to have seen is a deeper discussion as to why the fight against smog in L.A. has been so difficult, why business, politicians, and average Angelenos have been so resistant to the smog fighting programme.  Having said that, Smogtown, despite being largely sizzle, is highly entertaining and well worth the read.

 

Friday
25Sep2009

Cities in the 21st Century: A Primer

By John Matthew Barlow.

Cities: A Groundwork Guide
by John Lorinc
US: Groundwood Books, 2009. 140pp., $10.00.
UK: Groundwood Books, 2009. 140pp., £5.46.

Last year was a watershed for humanity.  It was the first time that a majority of people, worldwide, lived in urban areas.  This was fuelled by a process of urbanisation in the developing world; in western Europe and Canada, the majority of people lived in cities by the First World War.  The United States reached this milestone shortly thereafter.  But in the developing world, people remained primarily rural until the past couple of decades when industrialisation occurred, in large part because North American and European companies began to outsource and move production off-shore.  This, in turn, had massive consequences for cities in this part of the world, as jobs dried up and industrial areas were abandoned.  This has led to a paradoxical situation in terms of urbanism in the world.  For example, Manila has grown by some 10.5 million people since 1951 to its present population of 12 million.  Meanwhile, Detroit and other cities in the North American rustbelt have experienced depopulation in the past few decades.

Throughout all of this, cities, especially in the industrialised world, gain more power and influence, not just on the national scale (such as London, the British metropole), but on the global scale (London remains the financial capital of the world, a position it has held for centuries).  And in the process, cities, worldwide, continue to grow, becoming larger than some nations.  For example, there are more people in Tokyo than in all of Canada.  That is a mind-boggling thought, given the size of Canada’s geographic footprint (the 2nd largest nation in terms of landmass in the world) compared to that of Tokyo.

It is in this context that Canadian journalist John Lorinc has written a primer on cities for the 21st century, the appropriately titled Cities.  Lorinc is a specialist on urban affairs, his work having appeared in several Canadian publications; he also currently contributes to the New York Times’ eco-business blog, Green Inc.: Energy, the Environment, and the Bottom Line.  His last book, 2006’ The New City: How the Crisis in Canada’s Large Urban Centres is Re-Shaping the Nation (Penguin) was especially well-received and serves as somewhat of a basis for his argument in Cities, insofar as he notes the power of cities.  In Canada, a full one-third of the nation’s population lives in the three largest cities: Toronto, Montréal, and Vancouver.  In this sense, then, Lorinc is very well-positioned to ponder the plight, role, and impact of global cities in the 21st century.

Cities is the latest edition to a series from revered Canadian independent publisher, House of Anansi Press, the Groundwork Guides.  Previous volumes have examined topics as diverse as oil, empire, genocide, slavery, and sex.  The series is meant to provide an overview of cultural and political issues, offering “both a lively introduction and a strong point of view.” [back cover].  Lorinc accomplishes both, this volume is a lively discussion of the role and plight of cities, and though his “strong point of view” is somewhat muted in his prose, it is very clear.  Lorinc argues that we must be conscious and aware of the impact of cities on our wider culture, their economic, cultural, and political power, to say nothing of their environmental impact, and the plight of the poor in the megacities of the developing world.  In making this argument, though, Lorinc isn’t really saying anything new, nor anything controversial.  He covers the expected, and says the expected.

Rather than focus on the positives of city life and urbanism, like other urbanists like Jane Jacobs and Richard Florida, Lorinc is more interested in problematising the city.  And this is beneficial tact to take.  Whereas as Jacobs and Florida focus on how the city is a creative force, a site of community, and so on, this is limiting argument and only deals with a minority of cities and a minority of people in cities worldwide.  Lorinc’s more comprehensive approach to the city allows for a wider analysis, both in the developed and developing worlds.  Indeed, the problem with Florida, in particular, is that he is not all that interested in slums and the poor in North American’s cities, which is troubling.

Nevertheless, while Lorinc travels down a road already well-travelled in Cities, his gift lies in the quick and coherent synthesis of the urban condition in the new century.  Broken up into 7 simple chapters, he gives us an overview of the issues facing cities the world over today.  He also moves easily from the developed to the developing worlds, between the historical and the contemporary.  Each chapter covers a central concept of urbanism: the city in the 21st century, urban forms and functions, sprawl, the environment and energy, transportation, poverty, and crimes, epidemics, and terrorism.  In addition to this division, the book is unofficially split so that the first half more or less focuses on the developed world, whilst the second half deals with the developing world.  The division isn’t absolute, of course, as both halves of the globe fit into the discussion throughout. 

Central to the analysis is the environment, and the city’s impact upon it, in both the developed and developing world.  Each chapter serves as an introduction to the topic and hand, and whilst it is impossible for Lorinc to be comprehensive and exhaustive in the roughly 20 pages devoted to each chapter, he excels in introducing the problems and challenges facing cities to his readers.

Cities are incredibly complex and complicated socio-political structures.  They require careful- and micro- management; problems arise from dense population structures, complicated landscapes, environmental degradation, communications and transportation, amongst other things.  And Lorinc is best at pointing out that the problems that the megacities of the developing world face are problems that cities in the developed world are perpetually struggling with.

Most obvious here is the question of the environment.  Cities are cesspools of pollution and toxicity.  As noted, Lorinc’s discussion of the environmental impact of cities dominates this book; no fewer than 3 chapters (3: Sprawl Happens; 4: Environment and Energy; 5: Cities and Transportation) are dominated by environmental questions.  Chapter 3 examines the environmental (and socio-cultural) consequences of urban sprawl, primarily in Europe and North America.  Here, Lorinc touts cities that have managed to tout responsible development, vertical rather than horizontal.  Manhattan and the west end of Vancouver are two such examples, as they provide high-density urban settlement of high-rise condo development.  His argument is hurt, however, in a table that accompanies this discussion, a “selected” listing of the population density of the worlds 250 largest cities.  The table, however, is ultimately meaningless, in part because we don’t know the overall population of the cities, and the neighbourhoods/boroughs that he points to in his text aren’t in the table.  Manhattan is grouped in with the rest of New York City, which sees its density rating fall to 16th on the table (though whether that is 16th in the world or not is another matter entirely) and Vancouver isn’t listed at all.  In short, this table is rendered ultimately useless, as it offers us no real basis of comparison.  For example, while it is clear that Atlanta is much less dense than, say, London, this nugget means nothing to me without information on overall population size and geographic footprint of the two cities.

Lorinc also focuses on the degradation of the air we breathe in urban centres, offering a quick discussion of air-borne pollution in western cities during the industrial revolution.  Here he notes that by the 1880s, London’s air was close to being a toxic soup.  Oddly, though, he doesn’t mention the most obvious and famous example of air-borne toxicity in the developed world: Los Angeles.  That being said, he notes the lack of political will in battling air-borne pollution, politicians were not all that keen on dealing with the problem because of the damage it would to do the local economy and business.  Whilst London is his example, nearly every industrial city in Western Europe and North America has faced this problem.  Indeed, this seems to still be the crux of the question of global warming and environmental degradation today, as politicians remain unwilling to show leadership and make hard decisions, out of fear of upsetting the populace and damaging the economy (despite the fact that many studies note that implementing the Kyoto Accord would not harm the economy in the way that its alarmist opponents suggest), to say nothing of their chances at re-election.

Lorinc then nicely segues into a discussion of “Environmental Degradation in the South’s Megacities.”  Here, he deftly explores the problems facing these cities.  For example, he points to Lagos, the largest city and capital of Nigeria, which is a bustling metropolis of 7.9 million (Lorinc incorrectly states the population of Lagos is 15 million).  He cites journalist George Packer, who has noted that the inner-city urban slums of Lagos are, in part, built on and around a heavily-polluted lagoon.  (As an aside, it is interesting to note that Lagos’ entry on Wikipedia makes no mention of the city’s slums). The polluted water of Lagos Lagoon is where the poor draw their water from, and where fishermen catch food.  The consequences of this for the health of these slum residences are obvious.  In discussing Lagos’ problems, however, it is interesting to note that Lorinc doesn’t point to the obvious source of the problem of pollution and a lack of regulation: there is no central urban government for the Lagos metropolitan area, the municipal government that does exist only serves a small core at the centre of the city.

Emissions are also a problem in these megacities of the developing world.  Even smaller cities are moving towards an environmental apocalypse.  Recently, China eclipsed the United States as the world’s emissions leader; of the top 20 cities in terms of emissions worldwide, 16 are Chinese.  The problem, in part, is due to the fact that the Chinese tend to incinerate their garbage, which causes serious emissions problems.  But Lorinc misses the other side of the equation here: automobiles.  And China’s streets and roads teem with automobiles belching emissions into the environment.  Indeed, the picture of China Lorinc paints in Cities reminds me of Dr. Seuss’ iconic Lorax, who speaks for the trees.  But the Chinese experience also points to another question of emissions and global warming, as the developing world is unwilling to be held to standards designed to ease the problems, arguing that such regulations would be handicaps to their own development.  They quickly point to the fact that North American and European nations were not subjected to such regulation during their period of industrialisation.

The discussion about trash is important because garbage dumps are quickly emerging not just as environmental disasters waiting to happen, but because slums are developing in and around them in various cities, such as Lagos, Buenos Aires, and Manila, amongst others.  In these cities, garbage is just piled up on top of itself in dumps (not that the developed world has a great record here, New York City has garbage barges floating in its harbour, and Toronto is engaged in an on-going battle with Michigan about where to put its garbage).  Dumps in these developing world cities have become the site of labour-intensive recycling businesses.  Scavengers, many of them children, dig through the dumps earning their keep, usually a few dollars a day, which they earn by selling what they find to scrap companies.  The scrap companies themselves turn around and make a handsome profit by selling the goods to recycling companies.  Not surprisingly, work conditions are brutal and dangerous, not to mention unsanitary.  It doesn’t take much of imagination to visualise these scrap-pickers climbing over the mountains of garbage, trying to avoid cesspools of toxic runoff, lethal smoke, bulldozers, garbage trucks, birds of prey, and insects.  Accidents can be fatal, Lorinc reports, such as in 2000 when the 20-hectare Pyatas dump in Manila capsized.  The garbage has been piled up to 13-storeys high when it fell over, smothering several hundred trash-pickers who lived in shanties at the foot of the garbage. 

But it’s not just these megacities in the global South that are leading us to environmental danger, writes Lorinc.  Cities in the developed world are also intimately connected to our long-term survival in terms of climate change: “The reason is that wealthy nations are heavily urbanized, so the way these cities grow has a direct bearing on the pace of global warming, which in turn is already causing havoc in populous low-lying cities.” [p. 56].  Here, he points to Tokyo as a model.  Tokyo’s housing requires less energy than is the case in Europe and North America; the city is more tightly-packed and the transit system is both cost-effective and efficient, making the city easier to navigate.

Lorinc spends some time discussing environmentally-responsible architecture, as well as the reclamation of brownfields for housing and other purposes.  Brownfields are former industrial areas, located all over cities in the developed world, the consequence of the de-industrialisation of the developed world in the mid-20th century.  Lorinc correctly points to the redevelopment of brownfields in city cores as a means of increasing density, as well as developing better transit systems.  But he misses a prime opportunity to discuss the legacy of industrialisation in North American and Western European cities.  For example, I live in a former industrial neighbourhood in Montréal, surrounded by former factories and other sorts of industrial concerns.  My neighbourhood is like many around Europe and North America; cities like Pittsburgh have been left with massive brownfields that they have tried to redevelop to recover from deindustrialisation.  Some of the factories in my neighbourhood have been reclaimed as condos and office space.  Others, like the former metalshop that forms the backwall of my back garden, stand derelict and abandoned.  Nearby is the Lachine Canal, on the banks of which the Canadian industrial revolution began back in the 1840s.  In other words, I live in a neighbourhood that has been the site of almost continual industrial activity for the past 160 years (a few factories and railyards still exist).  To this day, the leisure craft that ply the canal today (it has been reclaimed as a recreation site) cannot travel at speeds in excess of 15 km/h, otherwise they run the risk of stirring up the toxic silt on the floor of the canal.  Redevelopment in my neighbourhood usually means cleaning the soil, but either way, there are serious environmental issues in neighbourhoods such as mine, one that Lorinc doesn’t explore.

One way in which North American cities, in particular, can contribute to reversing climate change is through the implementation of viable public transit systems.  Most of the major cities in Canada and the US have good public transit: New York City, Chicago, Boston, Montréal, Toronto, for example.  Others, however, do not, such as Houston, or Calgary, or Atlanta.  These three cities are also home to considerable urban sprawl.   And Lorinc notes that this sprawl isn’t conducive to public transit:

there’s a powerful economic relationship between transit, population density and land-use planning.  Transit agencies must make substantial investments in vehicles and other equipment, like signalling systems.  They have hefty operating expenses, such as drivers’ salaries, vehicle maintenance and fuel costs…without a critical mass of riders, transit service becomes unaffordable and inefficient.  In general, transit riders want convenience, reliable and efficient service, and value for their money.  When a transit service doesn’t generate enough revenue, it often cuts back on service – for example, by reducing the number of vehicles running on any given route.  And when that happens, commuters…are much more likely to rely on their vehicles. [pp. 72-3]

And whilst this is certainly true, what Lorinc overlooks is that two of his examples of sprawl cities, Houston and Calgary, are the centres of the oil industry in the United States and Canada.  Another city with a shoddy public transportation system is Detroit, home of the domestic car industry in the United States.  In the case of Detroit, the car companies made sure that the city didn’t have a viable and efficient public transit system; what would it say if the home of the car companies had efficient transit?  It would hurt their bottom lines.  Certainly, the fact that public transit in Calgary and Houston is a dodgy proposition is not all that surprising.

The discussion of epidemics and the city in the final chapter is quite timely, given the worldwide paranoia about H1N1.  Our concentration in cities will make the transmission of H1N1 faster and more intense (though, of course, H1N1 remains less potent than common influenza, at least in Canada and the United States).  Indeed, cities in the industrialised world used to be cesspools of disease and epidemics, even as recently as the late 19th century.  Montréal was the site of the last smallpox epidemic in the industrialised west, in 1885.  Epidemiology in 1885 was only starting to develop, but its successive advancement throughout the 20th century has meant that epidemics like the Spanish influenza in the wake of World War I have become increasingly a thing of the past.  Governments, at all levels, have recognised their responsibility to protect the health and lives of their citizens. To that end, massive public health bureaucracies have grown in the industrialised north to protect us from disease.  However, this doesn’t mean that we are no longer vulnerable.  Lorinc reminds us of this when he points to the 2003 SARS outbreak in Toronto.  SARS originated in the Guangdong region of China before spreading, primarily to Hong Kong, Singapore, and Toronto.  Why an outbreak occurred in Toronto, rather than Vancouver, itself a major city of the Chinese diaspora, is instructive.  In Ontario, the province of which Toronto is the capital, a right-wing, anti-big government administration came to power 8 years earlier, and proceeded to radically slash government spending in all areas, including public health.  The consequences were disastrous, as hundreds were infected and quarantined, and 43 people died in Toronto from SARS, as hospitals lacked the resources to deal with the infection (in Walkerton, Ontario, a small city, government cutbacks led to a fatal outbreak of eColi in the water supply in 2000 that led to half the city getting ill and at least 7 deaths).  Meanwhile, in Vancouver, writes Lorinc,

provincial labor officials had trained health care workers in the proper use of special masks and other safety systems designed to protect them from catching contagious diseases while administering emergency procedures to ill patients.[p. 121].

All in all, Lorinc provides us with an instructive and lively introduction to the problems facing cities and, as a result, humanity in the urban century.  That being said, however, his conclusion remains rather trite and does a disservice to the discussion throughout the book:

The twenty-first metropolis will be a concentrated place of nearly unfathomable diversity – ethnic, social, economic, environmental, religious.  Large cities have become a microcosm of everything that’s taking place in this complex world.  For good or ill, they are our future. [p. 128].

Monday
07Sep2009

Afghanistan and the UK's Desperate Flirtation With America

Increasingly, the British public seems to be adopting the view that the war in Afghanistan is either unwinnable, unaffordable, unnecessary, or all of the above. But perhaps that's because few people are telling them why we're really there. With this in mind, I was interested to see what a room full of journalists would have to say at the Frontline Club’s inaugural First Wednesday open forum. The results were largely underwhelming.  

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Thursday
20Aug2009

The Hurt Locker: a new kind of war film

The Hurt Locker has already garnered the epithet of ‘first great Iraq war movie’ since its US release back in June, but that might actually be an underestimation. For a start, it has an intensity that will leave your bowels twisted and your nails bleeding; and it’s made a star of a nobody in James Renner. But, more importantly, by side-stepping the question of the war’s founding morality and justification, director Kathryn Bigelow has achieved something quite new for the war genre. Her resolute focus on the daily activities of a small cog in the military machine – namely, a bomb disposal unit in 2004 Baghdad – results in a film that is neither anti-war polemic nor gung-ho propaganda piece. Rather, she simply seeks to represent the unadorned and bleak reality of daily routine, with the caveat that the daily routine in question happens to be a horrifically dangerous nightmare.

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Saturday
08Aug2009

Hacking The Deep Ecology of War

By Michael A. Innes.

Somewhere between the relational turn in social science and increasingly granular approaches to warfighting, the reality of international relations, and accounts of the wars being fought from core to periphery, have been looking more and more like exercises in hacking deep ecology. In The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One, David Kilcullen leverages"conflict ethnography" to help explain insurgencies in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere. In Blue Helmets and Black Markets: The Business of Survival In the Siege of Sarajevo, Peter Andreas fine tunes international political economy through a close reading of the lives of the city's residents. Similarly, in Shadows of War: Violence, Power, and International Profiteering In the Twent-First Century, Carolyn Nordstrom digs into the "deep politics of war".

The list goes on. Some academicians, I'm sure, would probably shake their heads and mutter "big deal - we've been doing that forever...". I suppose the point isn't a vapid assertion that anthropologists are out there doing ethnographic studies, or that historians are telling more richly detailed stories of what's going than anyone else. Or even that warfighters are relying increasingly on thick description to better understand the battlespace. What's interesting about this - not what's new, which isn't what I'm suggesting, but what makes this more engaging and accessible - is that there's a deep ecology of virtual violence, ambient warfare, and fluid interfaces, and no single discipline has a lock on how best to decipher and map out its surfaces to get at the underneath of things.

Interestingly, references to "epicenters" keep popping up. Shadows of War, the book's jacket description tells us, "is grounded in ethnographic research carried out at the epicenters of political violence on several continents." The point not made is that digging at the details, getting to the story beneath the story, means looking to the event beneath the event - to that spot beneath the epicentre that actually constitutes gound zero: the hypocenter. Thick description is the stuff of better storytelling, exposing the sub-rosa details that enable a more critical appreciation of war's frames, regimes, paradigms, artefacts, and metaphors.  I won't go so far as to suggest that this represents a turn in the literatures - more that there's much to recommend hacking the deep ecology of conflict and crisis to better understand, in empirical terms, its hypocenters.

The Author, Gandamack Lodge Foyer, Kabul, Afghanistan, May 2009. Image Copyright Michael A. Innes.Not everyone tells a good story. More often than not, it takes a concerted journalistic effort to translate things for public consumption. Sometimes, some would argue - if I can be forgiven the green metaphor - journalists focus on intimate details to the point of losing the forest for the trees. When the storytelling is good, on the other hand, the trees, forests and everything else spin a rich weave. Which is a long-winded way of getting to the point that I read something neat a couple of weeks ago. Stumbling across Peter Beaumont's The Secret Life of War: Journeys Through Modern Conflict, I was struck by the excerpt on the back cover: "Most of the time contact is less awful than the anticipation of it. In the action and adrenaline, an occult layer is stripped away. What follows is the moment when war reveals itself: a busy-ness about staying alive even when you are curled up in a ditch or hiding in a basement."

I've only just started reading The Secret Life of War. The writing is brilliant, evocative, textured, and resonates with something I've been thinking about for years now: the tactile realities of guerrilla warfare. Not post-modern desciptions of thin air, or theoretical disquisitions on invisible terrorists, but the material ghosts hovering about behind the murky translucencies of the fog of war and politics. The ones, as opposed to the zeros. "Observed from a distance," Beaumont writes, "war is defined by its most visible phenemena - the killing, destruction and displacement. They are solid things, assessable through numbers, statistic and dates - even the bald two-line report describing how [a soldier] died," the details of which "are boringly, intentionally prosaic, skulking around the edges of his death."

They represent the aspect of conflict it is possible easily to map through its battles and altering front lines, the war of press conferences, statements and newspaper reports. But conflict has another quality that exists at the margins of observable violence. A hinterland electric with words and stories, with the telling and retelling that enfolds war's central facts, it is this periphery that gives to conflict its real, deep and resonant meaning. Alive with voices... searching for ways to describe their experience, it is imaginative and unreliable - dense with evasions, excuses, lies and hatreds. Yet even this unreliability is more truthful, more personal and more authentic than the cleaned up and sterile official version: real and human as it is in its failings.

The Gandamack Lodge, Kabul, Afghanistan. May 2009. Image Copyright Michael A. Innes.

It wasn't until I actually started reading The Secret Life of War that I realized my connection of sorts to Beaumont. I'd initially confused him with Peter Jouvenal, the founder and owner of the Gandamack Lodge in Kabul, once described as "the hardest pub in the world." I had the opportunity to visit the Gandamack in late May. The drive leading up to its steps is accessible from the street but protected behind non-descript armoured blast doors and ensconced, like so many locations in Kabul, within its own guarded urban compound.  At the time, I wanted to look up its owner, Jouvenal, a former soldier and BBC journalist, and maybe buy him a drink in his own bar. I didn't, to my regret. Maybe another time. Now, as I read this book, by Beaumont, I'm reminded of that brief experience. The dusty, sepia-toned night drive in an armoured SUV to get to the Gandamack. The halved 500lb Soviet bomb casings that serve as plant pots in its courtyard. The vintage weapons that line its atmospheric foyer. The menu that offers not "sauteed aubergine" but, in an hysterical misspelling, "sated aborigine". The business cards (now, including my own), tacked to the heavy wood beams in the Gandamack's cramped, musty, basement bar - most of them of soldiers, security consultants, academics, internationals working for the UN, NATO, or NGOs.

I look forward to going back, soon, to finding and feeling the grit and grime of places in between, to sorting through the truthful unreliability of that hinterland electric with words and stories.

Sunday
02Aug2009

Chomsky: How The US Won The Vietnam War

Old Noam's views can sometimes verge into conspiracist territory, but I've decided to run with his argument that America had effectively won the Vietnam War by the mid-1960s and just wasted their time (and a horrible number of lives) by hanging around for any longer. There are clear parallels to Afghanistan and Iraq to draw out of this theory.

Chomsky argues that postwar American foreign policy was mostly concerned with maintaining dominance in its areas of interest, and that the biggest threat to this were cocky little upstarts like Fidel Castro and Ho Chi Minh who seemed to think they could run their countries on their own terms without bending to American whims. Henry Kissinger viewed their actions as a dangerous infection because it set an example that, if successful, might be copied by other erstwhile vassals of the American empire.

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Wednesday
22Jul2009

Addicted To Drug Policy

The Frontline Club brought together three of the UK’s leading authorities on the issue for a discussion and although they had sharply differing views on what should be done, they all agreed that the current efforts of policymakers, both at national and international level, are atrociously inept. Not just ineffective, in fact, but morally bankrupt.

When the UN Office on Drugs and Crime met earlier this year in Vienna, they looked back at their last 10 year programme and decided that at least the situation had not got any worse. That was a pretty forgiving view. A report by the European Commission concluded that: “Broadly speaking, the situation has improved a little in some of the richer countries while for others it worsened, and for some it worsened sharply and substantially, among them a few large developing or transitional countries."

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Monday
13Jul2009

Taking the Politics Out of Insurgency

In their new book, War 2.0: Irregular Warfare in the Information Age, Thomas Rid and Marc Hecker propose that international Islamic terrorism can never move past the point of being a terrorist movement to become a fully fledged insurgency because its political programme is simply unrealistic and can never win over enough popular support to achieve its stated aims of political change. They conclude that “a wedge” should be driven between terrorism and insurgency. As Rid says, “the idea that an Islamic organisation will take over Europe is preposterous ... It has become almost impossible for them to evolve into a classical insurgency. The movement is there but can’t grow into a serious political force.”

My questions are this: in the globalised network age, does an insurgency still need to maintain a credible political agenda to be considered an insurgency? How have the changes brought by globalisation – particularly the evolution of telecommunications – altered the concept of insurgency?

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Sunday
12Jul2009

A Tear In The Consciousness: Irony, Secrecy, and Dissimulation

The latest issue of Harper's includes a tongue-in-cheek proposal for a study of "weaponized irony" (not, not iron-working; the "it's ironical" kind of irony), and development of a sort of semantic mapping technology, the "Ironic Cloud". According to Harper's, "Last winter, Lockheed Martin Corporation approached Princeton University with a request for research initiatives." Sounds like a Minerva sub-contract." In April, [D. Graham] Burnett, an historian of science, and [Jeff] Dolven, a professor of English,

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